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The Relationship between Top Management Team – Outside Board 
Conflict and Outside Board Service Involvement in High-Tech Start-ups  
 
 
Abstract 
Corporate governance research has extensively studied the relationship between outside 
board characteristics and outside board involvement. We add to this literature by 
investigating the extent to which interactions between outside board members and the top 
management team (TMT) affect the functioning of the outside board. Building on conflict 
theory, our study shows how conflict between TMT and outside board is an important 
antecedent for outside board service involvement. Specifically, drawing from a hand-collected 
dataset of 70 high-tech start-ups in Belgium, we find that TMT – outside board task conflict is 
both directly and indirectly, i.e. through TMT – outside board relationship conflict, related to 
outside board service involvement. 
 
Introduction 
The importance of good corporate governance for organizational development has 
prompted many researchers to study the functioning of the outside board (e.g. Johnson, Daily, 
and Ellstrand 1996; Uhlaner, Wright, and Huse 2007). Outside boards comprise individuals 
who are not part of the TMT, its associates or families, not employees of the firm or its 
subsidiaries, and not members of the immediate past top management group (Pearce, and 
Zahra 1991). The TMT (Top Management Team) comprises all top managers involved in 
strategic decision making as identified by the CEO (Amason 1996). Generally, prior corporate 
governance research has mainly considered the effects of outside board structure, composition 
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and demographics on outside board involvement, while neglecting the potential influence of 
outside board dynamics (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella 2003; Finkelstein, and Mooney 2003; 
Huse 2005; Huse 2007; Leblanc, and Schwartz 2007). Outside boards are however expected 
to operate as active teams (Letendre 2004). In these teams, among other factors, such as board 
competencies and capabilities (Lin, Li, and Chen 2006; Walsh, and Linton 2011), 
(inter)personal relationships can shape decision-making (Payne, Benson, and Finegold 1999), 
subsequent outside board participation (Neill, and Dulewicz 2010) and the functioning of the 
outside board (Kor 2006). Indeed, Pettigrew (1992) argued that research on boards should be 
integrated with studies on the TMT. Along the same lines, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
referred to outside boards as “supra TMTs” standing at the strategic apex of a firm (Mintzberg 
1973). Building on research suggesting that TMTs and outside boards should not be viewed 
as separate units (Krishnan et al. 2011; Nielsen 2010; Vanaelst, et al. 2006; Westphal, and 
Zajac 2013), our research explores the interpersonal dynamics between the TMT and the 
outside board. 
Studies on outside boards have largely focused on their monitoring function (John and 
Senbet 1998; Markman, Balkin, and Schjoerdt 2001; Van de Berghe, and Baelden 2005). 
Board members engage in this function as they typically have the required human capital to 
do so (Bettis, and Prahalad 1995; Hillman, and Dalziel 2003). We extend this contention to 
the board service role. This is particularly relevant as, in contrast to the monitoring role, the 
outside boards’ service involvement has received less attention (van den Heuvel, Van Gils, 
and Voordeckers, 2006). Through service involvement, outside boards can not only provide 
advice but also help build external legitimacy and new contacts for the firm (Hillman, and 
Dalziel 2003; Pfeffer 1972). Through their involvement in such service tasks, the outside 
board can improve the firm’s decision-making process (Donaldson, and Davis 1991; Stiles, 
and Taylor 2001) as well as enhance the relationship between the firm and its environment 
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and its most important stakeholders (Zahra, and Pearce 1989). Therefore, given that the 
outside board is more than a controlling entity, our research seeks to provide greater insight 
into outside board service involvement by considering the interaction and dynamics between 
the TMT and outside board. 
We focus in particular on the impact of different types of conflict between the TMT and 
outside board on outside board service involvement. While most studies have investigated 
intragroup conflict (Jehn, and Bendersky 2003), to our knowledge, no research has addressed 
conflict between different decision-making bodies. A notable exception is the study by 
Collewaert (2012), examining conflict between entrepreneurs and angel investors. Our focus 
on conflict is justified by the complexity of decision-making outside boards are faced with, 
which requires them to bring into play various standpoints and perspectives (Forbes, and 
Milliken 1999). Given that the TMT and outside board are expected to work together to 
achieve firm success (Finkelstein, and Hambrick 1996), conflicts will be inevitable. A large 
body of research has examined the impact of conflict on group performance, with a consensus 
emerging that task conflict can be linked to improved decision-making (Amason, and 
Sapienza 1997; Jehn, and Mannix 2001) whilst pointing to the negative effects of relationship 
conflict (Jehn 1997; Simons, and Peterson 2000). Task conflict refers to differences of 
opinion about the content of the task, whereas relationship conflict occurs when decision-
makers disagree on issues that are personal and reflect resentment (Jehn 1997; De Dreu, and 
Weingart 2003). However, despite this theoretical consensus, empirical support still remains 
inconsistent (De Dreu, and Weingart 2003; de Wit, Greer, and Jehn 2012; O’Neill, Allen, and 
Hastings 2013), which may, in part, be attributed to methodological issues (Amason, and 
Loughry 2014) and / or inadequate theorizing about the relationship between the different 
types of conflict. We suggest that task conflict positively affects group performance, but that 
this effect on performance may be weakened due to the effect of task conflict on relationship 
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conflict. As such, by investigating the mediating role of relationship conflict, we provide a 
more fine-grained understanding into the underlying dynamics of the task conflict – outside 
board service involvement relationship.  
Based on the above discussion, our research question can be presented as follows: How 
and to what extent do task and relationship conflict between the TMT and the outside board 
influence outside board service involvement?  To address this research question, we focus on 
high-tech start-ups. This context is theoretically interesting and relevant for a number of 
reasons. First, high-tech ventures are faced with a number of dependencies due to the 
liabilities of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe 1965; see also Forbes, and Milliken 1999; 
Garg 2013; Knockaert, and Ucbasaran 2013; Lynall, Golden, and Hillman 2003; Zahra, and 
Pearce 1989). The effects of these dependencies are often accentuated by the gaps in the 
knowledge base of their TMTs who often have homogenous backgrounds (Ensley, and 
Hmieleski 2005; Han, and Benson 2010). In order to overcome these dependencies, the 
engagement of the outside board in its service tasks is crucial (Zahra, Filatotchev, and Wright 
2009). Second, high tech ventures operate in dynamic and uncertain competitive 
environments requiring constant innovation (George, et al. 2001). The heightened need for 
creative problem solving and innovation in high-tech ventures makes external sources of 
knowledge (Dees, and Hill 1996) and task conflict (Amason, Shrader, and Tompson 2006; 
Olson, Parayitam, and Bao 2007) particularly important. Experienced outside board members 
can be an asset to the new venture (Kroll, Walters, and Le 2007) by bringing new perspectives 
and in doing so, generating task conflict (Amason, and Sapienza 1997). 
In high-tech ventures, therefore, outside boards are unlikely to act solely to rubber stamp 
decisions made by the TMT (Lorsch, and MacIver, 1989; Knockaert, Bjornali, and Erikson 
2015), but instead engage actively in the service tasks outlined above. While much of the 
extant research in the context of high-tech start-ups has focused on TMT and/or board 
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demographics, for instance by emphasizing the need to incorporate people with a commercial 
and technical background (Prahalad, and Hamel 1990; Knockaert et al. 2011; Vandenbroucke 
et al. 2014) we still lack an understanding of how interpersonal relationships shape the 
functioning of high-tech start-up boards. These reasons make the high-tech start-up context 
particularly appropriate for our research objective. 
We seek to make a number of contributions to the corporate governance, entrepreneurship 
and conflict literatures. First, we respond to recent studies calling for a move beyond board 
demographics to examine what drives outside board involvement (Huse 2007; Pugliese, 
Nicholson, and Bezemer 2015; Zona, and Zattoni 2007). In our case, we focus on how the 
relationship between TMTs and outside boards shapes outside board engagement. 
Furthermore, by studying the service tasks of the outside board, which have remained fairly 
neglected (van den Heuvel, Van Gils, and Voordeckers 2006) in the high-tech start-up 
context, we contribute not only to the corporate governance literature but also the 
entrepreneurship literature.  Indeed, notwithstanding the importance of the TMT as a key 
decision making body, entrepreneurship scholars have mostly studied TMTs at the expense of 
another potentially important decision-making body, namely, the outside board. Finally, we 
enrich knowledge about conflict by clarifying the association between task and relationship 
conflict and their direct and indirect effect on group involvement. We see this as an important 
contribution to the conflict literature. Further, while both types of conflict have mainly been 
studied in an intragroup setting (De Dreu, and Weingart 2003), our research shows that it is 
beneficial to investigate conflict in an intergroup context, i.e. between organizational 
decision-making groups, in our case the TMT and the outside board. 
In what follows, we first build on conflict theory to develop our conceptual framework 
explaining the relationship between TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board 
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service involvement. We then describe our research methodology. Finally, we present our 
results and discuss their implications for academia and practice. 
Conceptual Framework 
Beyond the TMT, the outside board is often considered an important decision-making 
body in a firm (Daily, et al. 2002). Further, at least in theory, the TMT and outside board 
should collaborate in order to realize the firm’s full potential (Anderson, Melanson, and Maly 
2007; Finkelstein, and Hambrick 1996; Nielsen 2010; Nicholson, and Kiel 2004). Given that 
interactions between both parties are necessary to exchange information, we argue that task-
related discussions between TMT and outside board are required in order for the outside 
board to get involved in its service-related activities. Since the outside board and the TMT 
may voice different perspectives (Wu et al. 2010), task conflict (i.e. content-related 
differences in opinion about the content of the task (Jehn 1997)) are inevitable (Amason 
1996). Task conflict stimulates both parties to explore new ideas and opportunities, enabling 
them to consider a broader range of viewpoints, options and issues (Ensley, Pearson, and 
Amason 2002). Latimer (1998) for example, argued that TMT members can better pinpoint 
problem-solving strategies when they get exposed to others’ standpoints. Task conflict can 
therefore serve as a resource (Miller, Burke, and Glick 1998) for both the TMT and the 
outside board, making it worthwhile to investigate conflict between both parties, rather than 
looking at the impact of conflict within the TMT (e.g. Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois 
1997; Lim, Busenitz, and Chidambaram 2012) or the board (e.g. Forbes, Korsgaard, and 
Sapienza 2010; Kerwin, Doherty, and Harman 2011) separately. 
Conflict is generally accepted to be multidimensional (Amason 1996; Jehn 1994; Pondy 
1969). One such dimension beyond task conflict is relationship conflict, i.e. conflict related to 
personal and emotional disagreement (Jehn 1997). Although theoretical work treats task 
conflict as beneficial for and relationship conflict as detrimental to group performance (Jehn 
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1995), empirical studies have so far remained inconsistent (Amason, and Loughry 2014). One 
explanation for this inconsistency may be because the impact of task conflict on group 
performance is more complicated than initially thought given its connection with relationship 
conflict (Simons, and Peterson 2000). Therefore, in what follows, we elaborate on this 
connection by considering the impact of both task conflict and relationship conflict on group 
performance, in our case, outside board service involvement. 
 
TMT – Outside Board Task Conflict and Outside Board Service Involvement 
Task conflict occurs when disagreements exist about the content of the task being 
performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions (Jehn 1995). Whether or 
not task conflict is beneficial depends on the group being investigated and the task being 
performed (Jehn 1995). In groups where tasks are routine-based and specific procedures and 
formalized policies are in place, task conflict tends to be less valuable (Olson, Parayitam, and 
Bao 2007). In more complex environments however, such as executive or directorial teams, 
there are few procedures at hand and uncertainty is likely to occur, which increases the need 
for a problem-solving mindset (Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig 1976). In decision-making 
groups performing non-routine, complicated and multifaceted tasks - often the case in high-
tech start-ups - task conflict can be highly beneficial. In such complex contexts, task conflict 
facilitates information exchange (Amason 1996), thereby fostering the development of new 
insights and enhancing group understanding (Amason 1996; Korsgaard, Schweiger, and 
Sapienza 1995). As a result, task conflict leads to decision-making groups becoming more 
engaged (De Dreu, and West 2001), allowing the members to more thoroughly consider 
alternatives in reaching high-quality decisions (Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1999; O’Neill, 
Allen, and Hastings 2013; Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan 1986). These effects of task 
conflict can increase group performance (Jehn, and Mannix 2001). Tjosvold, Dann and Wong 
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(1992) for example, showed that task conflict enabled marketing teams to use their resources 
more effectively to offer improved services to their customers.  
Following the reasoning above, we contend that conflict between two of the firm’s 
important decision-making bodies (i.e. the board and the TMT) (Daily, et al. 2002) may 
influence the outside board involvement in its service role. The outside board can use 
discussions and constructive task disagreements with the TMT to get acquainted with and to 
fully comprehend firm-specific situations (Castanias, and Helfat 2001; Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand 1996). Indeed, to increase its task understanding, the outside board needs to draw on 
multiple perspectives (Amason, and Schweiger 1994; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999) to be 
able to fulfill service tasks such as providing good guidance and advice (Forbes, and Milliken 
1999). Bayazit and Mannix (2003) for example, show that debate is inherently related to the 
outside board members’ role of being a valuable advisor. Moreover, when open discussions 
with the TMT are encouraged, the outside board not only gets informed, but also becomes 
more committed (Olson, Parayitam, and Bao 2007). Such commitment enables the outside 
board members to better perform their service tasks (Conger, Lawler, and Finegold 2001). We 
argue therefore that outside boards will be better able to give advice and to generate external 
legitimacy when they can constructively discuss content-related issues with the TMT. The 
reasoning above leads us to offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: TMT – outside board task conflict is positively related to outside board 
service involvement. 
 
TMT – Outside Board Task Conflict: The More the Better? 
Despite the expected positive influence of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside 
board service involvement, it is likely that there exists an optimal level of task conflict 
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(Boulding 1963; Jehn 1995; Miao et al. 2010) beyond which the participation of the outside 
board in its service tasks decreases. Jehn (1995) shows that too little task conflict causes 
members to ignore problems due to a lack of sense of urgency. As a result, decision-makers 
may pay insufficient attention to identifying and assessing the task problems at hand (Van de 
Vliert, and De Dreu 1994). Likewise, when excessive task conflict exists, severe and 
continuous discussions arise, resulting in a lack of consensus, which hinders effective 
decision-making (Gersick 1989). Trying to incorporate too many lines of thinking will make 
the outside board and the TMT lose sight as each party becomes increasingly unsatisfied with 
the lack of progress (Farh, Lee, and Farh 2010). If task conflict intensifies, members’ 
cognitive systems shut down, which might hinder rather than stimulate information 
processing, resulting in decreased group performance (Carnevale, and Probst 1998). Too 
much task conflict is costly in time and effort as it constrains the integration and evaluation of 
valuable information (De Dreu 2006; Jehn 1995). We therefore hypothesize a non-linear 
relationship between task conflict among the TMT and the outside board and the latter’s 
service involvement as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: TMT – outside board task conflict has an inverted U-shaped relation with 
outside board service involvement, such that TMT – outside board task conflict first enhances 
outside board service involvement, but impedes such involvement after a certain level. 
 
The Mediating Role of TMT – Outside Board Relationship Conflict 
We posit that this task conflict also indirectly influences the engagement of the outside 
board in its service tasks through relationship conflict. Specifically, task conflict may lead to 
relationship conflict, or disagreements based on personal differences and disaffection that 
undermine constructive interactions by provoking feelings of resentment (Amason 1996; 
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Buchholtz, Amason, and Rutherford 2005). Group members might misinterpret cognitive 
opinions as personal criticism (Eisenhardt, and Bourgeois 1988; Jehn 1997) and as such might 
respond emotionally to cognitive discussions (Mooney, Holahan, and Amason 2007). 
Moreover, members whose ideas get criticized or contradicted, “may feel that others in the 
group do not respect their judgment” (Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999, p.7). Therefore, 
although task and relationship conflict are separate constructs (Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 
2002), both types of conflict are causally related, such that task conflict may spill over into 
relationship conflict (Amason, and Sapienza 1997; Simons, and Peterson 2000). Similarly, in 
a TMT – outside board context, task conflict between both parties can lead to TMT – outside 
board relationship conflict. Although outside board members see discussions as part of 
normal business (Mason, and Harrison 1996), they might have different understandings and 
priorities compared to the TMT. These differences can give rise to a feeling of value 
dissimilarity (Jehn 1994), which causes task-oriented conflict to be perceived as personal 
disaffection. 
The potential effect of task conflict on relationship conflict has implications for group 
performance since relationship conflict can adversely affect group performance. The personal 
nature of relationship conflict can lead to feelings of anger, animosity and stress (Amason 
1996; Pelled 1996). As a result, teams have been reported to experience decreased cohesion 
(De Dreu, and Weingart 2003), judgment (Carnevale and Probst 1998), satisfaction (Jehn 
1994) and commitment (Amason 1996). Moreover, relationship conflict limits information 
processing as members spend time focusing on each other instead of dealing with task-related 
problems (Simons, and Peterson 2000). In turn, decision-quality and group performance are 
adversely affected (Amason 1996; De Dreu 2006). If the information processing between 
outside board and TMT is impeded due to a focus on emotional problems compared to task 
issues, outside board service involvement will inevitably be hindered. We therefore suggest 
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that task conflict between TMT and outside board will not only have directly (as hypothesized 
earlier) but also indirectly, i.e. through TMT – outside board relationship conflict, affect 
outside board service involvement. 
 
Hypothesis 3: TMT – outside board relationship conflict mediates the relation between 
TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service involvement. Specifically, higher 
levels of TMT – outside board task conflict lead to higher levels of TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict (H3a), in turn negatively affecting outside board service involvement 
(H3b). 
 
Our theoretical model is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>> 
 
Methodology 
 
Description of the Sample and Data 
Our study is based upon a hand-collected dataset of high-tech start-ups in Belgium 
constructed during 2011-2014. We considered firms to be high-tech start-ups if they met 
certain criteria which we based on the literature on high-tech start-ups. Specifically, these 
firms were active in high-tech sectors (as defined by Butchart (1987) and complemented by 
Burgel, Fier, and Licht (2004), who added high tech service sectors to the original list of 
relevant NACE codes) and were operating independently (Burgel, Fier, and Licht 2004). 
Additionally, they were 10 years or younger (Burgel, and Murray 2000; Colombo, and Grilli 
2010; Colombo, and Piva 2012), thus having been founded between 2001 and 2011. We selected 
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all firms meeting the above criteria in Belgium through Bel-First, the official public database 
which holds general, financial and board-related information on each Belgian corporation. 
This procedure resulted in a population of 195 firms1. However, given our focus on the 
outside board and the TMT, we needed to take into consideration that, especially in a start-up 
context, not all firms have an outside board and TMT. First, given the scope of our study, a 
firm needed to have minimum of one outside board member, defined as an individual who is 
not part of the TMT, its associates or families, not an employee of the firm or its subsidiaries, 
and not a member of the immediate past top management group (Pearce, and Zahra 1991). Of 
the 195 firms, 55 did not have an outside board, reducing our sample to 140 firms. Second, 
following Amason (1996), a TMT consists of the group of top managers involved in strategic 
decision-making as identified by the CEO. 18 firms in our original sample did not have a 
TMT in place, as only one person (the CEO) engaged in strategic decision-making. This 
further decreased our sample to 122 qualifying firms. Finally, 70 of these 122 firms (57%) 
were willing to cooperate in our research. Given the early stage nature of the firms in our 
sample, only two firms were listed on the stock exchange.  We performed structured face-to-
face interviews with the firms’ CEO during 2012-2014. Although time-consuming, this 
personal approach was required to retrieve often confidential and sensitive information, such 
as conflict-related data. 
The firms in our sample of 70 firms (for which we present the descriptive statistics in Table 2) 
on average have 3.5 TMT members (standard deviation of 1.4). The average TMT has a total 
of 58 years of work experience, most of which is in R&D (25 years), followed by 
management (16 years). The TMT’s cumulative sector experience is 37 years. The boards in 
our sample on average have 4 outside board members (standard deviation of 2). These 
outsiders are well-educated and experienced; the average outside board had 2 outside 
                                                 
1 We would like to point out that other ways for identifying (Belgian) high tech start-ups are also possible (e.g. 
Knockaert, and Ucbasaran, 2013). 
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members with a technical degree (engineering, mathematics, etc.) and around 1.6 board 
members with a non-technical degree (economics, psychology, etc.). The average outside 
board had cumulatively 78 years of working experience, 34 years of which was in 
management, 18 years in R&D, 14 years in finance, 7 years in marketing and 5 years in other 
functions (production, personnel,…). On average 1.6 of these outside board members had 
current or prior CEO experience.  
Our study focusses on TMT – outside board dynamics at the group level. Given that we 
primarily use the answers provided by the CEOs, we face the risk that their interpretation of 
TMT – outside board dynamics would differ from those of other TMT or outside board 
members. Nevertheless, this risk is lowered to a great extent since the interviewed CEOs 
specifically responded to questions related to the recent dynamics of a small group of people, 
about which they had extensive, first-hand knowledge (Chen, Fahr, and MacMillan 1993). 
Additionally, there is empirical evidence that group phenomena can be assessed in a reliable 
way by individual respondents (Atuahene-Gima, and Murray 2004; Westphal 1999). 
Furthermore, it is common for board studies to build upon responses from single respondents 
(Machold et al. 2011). Nonetheless, we deemed it necessary to also collect data from the other 
TMT and outside board members to assess the reliability and validity of the CEOs’ answers. 
After obtaining their email addresses through the CEO, we asked the TMT and outside board 
members to complete an online survey. We received additional information for 29 of the 70 
high-tech start-ups in our sample (41%). By using the Paired Samples T Test for those 29 
firms, we found that the responses of the CEOs did not differ significantly from those of the 
TMT and outside board members (p=.659 and .599 for the task and relationship conflict scale, 
respectively). As such, these answers provided limited but convincing evidence that the CEO 
answers were representative and could be used in our analyses. 
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Measures  
Dependent Variable. Outside board service involvement. We used Minichilli, Zattoni and 
Zona (2009)’s measure of service involvement. The items were as follows: “To what extent 
does the outside board  (1) contribute on management issues (2) contribute on financial 
issues, (3) contribute on technical issues, (4) contribute on market issues, (5) contribute on 
legal issues and taxation, (6) provide linkage to important external stakeholders, (7) provide 
the firm with external legitimacy and reputation, (8) promote strategic initiatives, (9) get 
involved in long-term strategic decision-making and (10) implement long-term strategic 
decision-making?”. Responses were recorded using a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(very small extent) to 7 (very large extent). The mean value was 4.12 and the Cronbach’s 
Alpha coefficient for the summated scale was .79. 
 
Independent and Mediator Variables. TMT – outside board task conflict was computed 
based on Pearson, Ensley, and Amason’s (2002) revised version of Jehn’s cognitive conflict 
scale (1995). The following questions were asked: “(1) How often do TMT and outside board 
members disagree about opinions regarding the work being done? (2) How frequently are 
there conflicts about the ideas outside board and TMT members have? (3) How much conflict 
about the work the outside board does is there between outside board and TMT members? (4) 
To which extent are there differences of opinion between outside board and TMT members?”. 
Responses were recorded using a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 7 (a lot). 
Likewise, TMT – outside board relationship conflict was measured based upon the revised 
version of Jehn’s affective conflict scale (1995) by Pearson, Ensley and Amason (2002). The 
following questions were posed: “(1) How much friction is there among outside board and 
TMT members? (2) How much are personality conflicts evident between outside board and 
TMT members? (3) How much tension is there among outside board and TMT members? (4) 
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How much emotional conflict is there among outside board and TMT members?”. Again, 
responses were recorded using a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 7 (a lot). 
The mean value for TMT – outside board task conflict was 3.05 and 2.78 for TMT – outside 
board relationship conflict. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were .88 and .90 for the 
summated task and relationship conflict scales respectively, indicating excellent reliability. 
 
In order to test the distinctiveness of our conflict scales, we performed a confirmatory 
factor analysis. We compared a two-factor model where the two latent variables were allowed 
to correlate, with a one-factor model where all eight items loaded on one latent variable. The 
results showed that the two-factor model (comparative fit index (CFI) = .98; root mean square 
of approximation (RMSEA) = .10 (confidence interval (CI): .027-.156); standardized root 
mean residual (SRMR) = .05) fits the data better than the one-factor model (CFI = .929; 
RMSEA = .18 (CI: .136-.233); SRMR = .075). This indicated that task and relationship 
conflict could be discriminated by respondents. Furthermore, our implementation of different 
measures for these types of conflict was inspired by theoretical arguments and supporting 
empirical evidence suggesting that task and relational conflict are distinct constructs and 
should be treated differently. This is for instance the case in the seminal and highly cited 
articles by Jehn (1995), Simons, and Peterson (2000), Pearson et al. (2002), and recent work 
by for instance O’Neill, Allen, and Hastings (2013). 
 
Control variables. In addition to our hypothesized predictors, several other aspects may 
influence outside board service involvement. Therefore, we control for firm age, firm 
industry, frequency of board meetings, CEO duality, venture capital ownership and 
outsider/insider ratio.  
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In order to take into account age-related effects, we control for firm age, measured as the 
natural log of the number of years since the company’s founding. The high-tech start-ups in 
our sample are on average 6.90 years old. Firm industry is assessed by introducing ICT 
industry and health and life sciences industry. These dummy variables become 1 if the 
company belongs to the corresponding industry category, and 0 otherwise. We control for 
firm industry based on institutional theory, signifying that organizational practices may be 
related to industry-specific norms (Eisenhardt 1988). Fifty two percent of our sampled firms 
belong to the ICT industry and twenty percent operate in the health and life sciences industry. 
The category “other industry” is used as the reference category. Frequency of board meetings 
is calculated as the yearly number of board meetings (Vafeas 1999). In order for outside 
boards to deliver firm-specific support, they need to get informed, which is made possible 
through frequently held board meetings. The firms in our sample on average hold 6.53 
meetings a year. CEO duality is a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO of the firm is 
also the board chair. CEO duality is controlled for as a central CEO-chair may advance 
transparency, definitely in a vibrant high-tech setting (Gabrielsson 2007). Forty one percent of 
the firms in our sample reported CEO duality. Venture capital ownership equals 1 if the firm 
has raised venture capital (VC), 0 otherwise. Forty four percent of the firms in our sample are 
VC-backed, which is high but not surprising, as this type of financing is often seen as one of 
the most appropriate ways of funding high-tech start-ups (Gompers, and Lerner 2001). We 
control for VC financing as outside boards in VC-backed firms may be more actively 
involved in strategic decision-making, which is one of the service tasks (Gabrielsson, and 
Huse 2002). Outsider/insider ratio is the proportion of outsiders to insiders in the board room. 
The motivation to control for this variable is that boards with higher proportions of outsiders 
may have more weight attributed to the outsiders in board decision-making (Haynes, and 
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Hillman 2010). The boards in our sample on average have almost three times as many 
outsiders as insiders. 
 
Results 
Given our focus on the interaction between outside boards and TMTs, we test our hypotheses 
on only those early stage high-tech ventures with a TMT and at least one outside board 
member. Questions on the conflict between TMT and outside board are irrelevant if there is 
no TMT (e.g. if there is only the CEO on the top management) or if there is no outside board. 
Eliminating firms without a TMT and outside board however gives rise to a sample selection 
problem as we would then work with a non-random sub-sample from the larger population of 
interest. In order to address this selection problem, we use a Heckman two-stage selection 
model to assure that our results are not affected by such self-selection effect (Heckman 1979). 
Essentially, this Heckman selection model entails a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, or 
the selection equation (presented in Table 1), a probit regression is used to determine whether 
the firms in our population have an outside board and TMT. We defined this dummy variable 
to be a function of the venture’s age, independence, industry, VC ownership and firm size (in 
terms of full time equivalents), which is largely in line with other selection models previously 
applied in board research (e.g. Knockaert, and Ucbasaran 2013).  
 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
 
 The results of the selection equation indicate that larger firms, as well as VC-backed firms 
are more likely to have both an outside board and TMT. These outcomes are not surprising, as 
larger firms need more structure and firm size is strongly associated with both TMT 
(Beckman, Burton, and O’Reilly 2007) and outside board (Zald 1969) size. Moreover, venture 
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capitalists typically require the establishment of an outside board and get a seat on the board 
following their investment (Gabrielsson, and Huse 2002; Gompers, and Lerner 2001). 
Based upon the results of this first-stage model, we predicted and saved the value for the 
inverse Mill’s ratio (λi), which is the monotone decreasing function of the probability that an 
observation is selected into our sample. In the second stage or regression equation, which 
estimates the outside board service involvement model (and which we use to test our 
hypotheses), the inverse Mill’s ratio enters as an explanatory variable. This two-stage 
procedure generates consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates (Heckman 1979).  
The descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables for those firms that have an 
outside board and a TMT are reported in Table 2. 
 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
 
Next, our main hypotheses were tested using regression analysis (step 2 of the Heckman 
selection procedure). Variance inflation factors ranged between 1.055 and 2.161, indicating 
that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in our study (Hair, et al. 2006). Additionally, 
we analyzed the nonlinear relationship between TMT – outside board task conflict and 
outside board service involvement and its mediating effect through TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict using the MEDCURVE macro for SPSS (Hayes, and Preacher 2010). 
This method provides bootstrap estimates with bias-corrected confidential intervals of the 
indirect effect. We particularly rely on this method as it allows us to specify the functional 
paths in the model and at the same time, it permits us to decompose the mediation model. As 
such, we set the relation between TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service 
involvement as quadratic and indicate TMT – outside board relationship conflict as being the 
mediation variable. 
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Figure 2 illustrates our conceptual model in a path diagram. The first model, in Panel A, is 
used to test whether TMT – outside board task conflict is related to outside board service 
involvement (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Of interest in this model is the estimate and test of the 
significance of path c. The second and third model, in Panel B, are pertinent to the estimation 
of the indirect effect of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service 
involvement through TMT – outside board relationship conflict (Hypothesis 3), derived from 
paths a and b. 
 
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>> 
 
The results of these main analyses are presented in Table 3. First, the control model 
contains control variables only. We find that the ICT industry dummy variable is significantly 
negatively related to outside board service involvement (B=-.660, p<.05). As such, companies 
in this industry seem to have boards that engage in their service role to a lesser extent. 
Moreover, high-tech start-ups holding more frequent board meetings experience higher levels 
of outside board service involvement (B=.110, p<.01). Second, Model 1 reports the total 
effect (c in Panel A of Figure 2) and estimates whether TMT – outside board task conflict has 
a positive effect on outside board service involvement. We find a significant positive 
relationship between TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service 
involvement (B=.295, p<.01), but no total quadratic effect, as the squared coefficient for task 
conflict is statistically insignificant. We therefore find support for Hypothesis 1, but no 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
 
<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>> 
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Finally, Model 2 and 3 decompose Model 1, allowing us to estimate the presence and level 
of the direct (c’ in Panel B of Figure 2) and indirect (a and b in Panel B of Figure 2) effect. 
We find a direct effect of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service 
involvement (B=.755, p<.05). This path is significantly mediated by the indirect effect of 
TMT – outside board relationship conflict (based on path a (B=.756, p<.001) and path b (B=-
.265, p<.05), the indirect effect is significantly negative; 95% CI [-.430; -.054]). Hence, our 
results provide support for Hypothesis 3, including our sub-hypotheses H3a and H3b. It is 
worth noting that the frequency of board meetings is positively associated with outside board 
service involvement (total effect in Model 1). Further, while board meeting frequency does 
not play a significant role in the first part of the indirect relationship (Model 2), it is a 
significant element in the second part of that relationship (Model 3).  
Discussion 
This paper has sought to contribute to our understanding of how board interpersonal 
dynamics – in our case, task conflict between TMT and outside board - affect outside board 
service involvement. Research adopting a conflict perspective has typically investigated 
conflict in an intragroup context, while our study explored the interactions between outside 
boards and TMTs, given that both parties are important decision-making units in a firm 
(Pettigrew 1992).  
Our analyses show that TMT – outside board task conflict does have a positive overall 
effect on outside board service involvement. Yet we also find relationship conflict between 
the TMT and the outside board to be an important mediator. Specifically, while there is a 
positive direct effect of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service 
involvement there is also a negative indirect effect through TMT – outside board relationship 
conflict. In other words, we find that task conflict does indeed increase outside board service 
involvement, but it also unintentionally triggers relationship conflict thereby weakening the 
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positive relationship between task conflict and board service involvement. Our findings may 
help explain the inconsistent findings reported by those studying task and relationship conflict 
in isolation (Mooney, Holahan and Amason 2007).  
 
Implications For Academia 
While our study indicates that not all high-tech start-ups have an outside board, we make a 
number of contributions to the corporate governance, entrepreneurship and conflict literatures. 
First, corporate governance and entrepreneurship literatures have primarily focused on the 
control tasks of the outside board (e.g. Baysinger, and Hoskisson 1990; Markman, Balkin, and 
Schjoerdt 2001). Yet, outside board service involvement is equally important, especially in 
early stage (high-tech) ventures, where advice and network access are crucial (Hillman, and 
Dalziel 2003; Huse 2007). As such, our study makes a contribution by highlighting conflict-
related dynamics between the TMT and the outside board which affect outside board service 
involvement. Moreover, our study makes a contribution by integrating the TMT (often the 
focus in entrepreneurship studies), and the outside board (often the focus in the corporate 
governance literature). We therefore respond to several calls to study outside boards and 
TMTs together instead of considering them as standalone entities (Carpenter, Pollock, and 
Leary 2003; Nicholson, and Kiel 2004; Nielsen 2010). Finally, we show that it is worthwhile 
investigating the interpersonal relationships between the TMT and outside board, rather than 
merely looking at their demographics. We follow in Zona and Zattoni’s (2007) footsteps who 
illustrate that corporate governance research needs to go beyond “the black box of 
demographics” when studying outside board service involvement. Second, by demonstrating 
the mediating effects of relationship conflict on the task conflict – outside board involvement 
relationship, we enrich the conflict literature by clarifying the complex relation between types 
of conflict and group performance.   
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Implications For Practitioners 
Our study has implications for (high-tech) entrepreneurs, outside board members and their 
stakeholders. Given the importance of task conflict in reaching superior decision-making, 
discussions in the boardroom should be stimulated in order to share different perspectives. At 
the same time, our findings indicate that the outside board should attempt to minimize the 
adverse effects of relationship conflict which, unfortunately, can accompany task conflict. 
Decision-making groups must realize that they come together to share diverse perspectives 
and thus should not let personal issues or emotions interfere in that process (O’Neill, Allan, 
and Hastings 2013).  
 
Limitations and Directions For Future Research 
While our research has both theoretical and practical implications, it also has limitations 
which may lead to future research directions. First, our research design was cross-sectional. 
While in line with the majority of conflict studies, further research could adopt a longitudinal 
design to explore how different types of conflict develop over time as well as the short-term 
and long-term consequences of these different types of conflict on outside board service 
involvement and ultimately, firm performance. Second, we conducted this study in one 
country, which allowed us to gain access to the CEO through face-to-face interviews, helping 
us achieve a high response rate. On the downside, it is more difficult to generalize the results 
to other regions. Future studies could therefore examine to what extent our results hold in 
different contexts, where other regulations and norms related to board composition and 
functioning may apply. Third, while our results indicated that outside board service 
involvement declines when task conflict spills over into relationship conflict, follow-up 
studies could investigate mitigating mechanisms or procedures. For instance, it may be 
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relevant to explore which board (chair) characteristics, interaction and communication 
patterns could mitigate or avoid this effect from taking place. Finally, it is worth noting that 
just over a quarter of the population we studied did not have a TMT and / or outside board. 
We do not know to what extent this is an informed choice. Future studies might usefully 
explore (high-tech) start-ups’ attitudes towards TMTs and outside boards.   
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Table 1 
Selection Equation 
Selection Equation (Step 1) 
Outside Board and TMT 0/1 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Firm age (ln) .49 
Firm independence -.25 
ICT industry -.44+ 
VC ownership .71* 
Firm size: number of full time equivalents .04** 
Constant -.08 
Significance levels: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 
 
Median 
25th 
percen-
tile 
75th 
percen-
tile 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Firm age (ln) 1.83 0.48 1.89 1.61 2.28           
2.ICT industry a 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 -.04          
3.Health and life sciences industry a 0.20 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 -.17 -.53         
4.Frequency of board meetings 6.53 3.36 6.00 4.00 8.50 -.04 .03 -.01        
5.CEO duality a 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 .06 .19 -.20 -.01       
6.VC ownership a 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 -.09 -.14 .41 -.05 -.25      
7.Outsider/insider ratio 2.98 2.10 2.98 1.33 4.00 -.02 -.21 .37 .01 -.28 .39     
8.Mills ratio 0.59 0.38 0.50 0.24 0.82 -.14 .41 -.44 .03 .25 -.71 -.39    
9.TMT – outside board task conflict 3.05 1.32 2.75 2.00 4.00 .00 .08 -.13 -.06 .13 -.16 -.10 .22   
10.TMT – outside board relationship conflict 2.78 1.42 2.25 1.75 4.00 -.04 .03 .03 -.08 .13 -.15 -.06 .19 .71  
11.Outside board service involvement 4.02 1.10 4.20 3.40 4.80 -.07 -.27 .13 .34 -.02 -.13 .04 .01 .27 .01 
Pearson correlation coefficients (1-tailed), indicating significant correlations (p<.05) in bold; N=70 
a Correlations of binary variables should be interpreted with care. 
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Table 3 
OLS Regression Model With MEDCURVE (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Control Model 
Outside Board 
Service Involvement 
 
Model 1 
Outside Board 
Service Involvement 
 
Model 2 
TMT – Outside Board 
Relationship Conflict 
Model 3 
Outside Board 
Service Involvement 
 
Constant 3.909*** 
(.766) 
2.923** 
(.869) 
.263 
(.952) 
2.586* 
(.988) 
Predictors     
TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
 .295** 
(.097) 
.756*** 
(.099) 
.755* 
(.380) 
TMT – outside board 
task conflict squared 
 -.058 
(.056) 
 -.044 
(.055) 
TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict 
   -.265* 
(.114) 
Controls     
Firm age (ln) -.143 
(.252) 
-.126 
(.266) 
.029 
(.291) 
-.114 
(.256) 
ICT industry -.660* 
(.280) 
-.574 
(.301) 
.162 
(.329) 
-.533 
(.291) 
Health & life sciences 
industry 
.078 
(.364) 
-.029 
(.398) 
.751 
(.436) 
.167 
(.394) 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
.110** 
(.032) 
.142*** 
(.035) 
-.023 
(.039) 
.136*** 
(.034) 
CEO duality .093 
(.237) 
.116 
(.269) 
.094 
(.294) 
.136 
(.260) 
VC ownership -.390 
(.337) 
-.293 
(.339) 
-.185 
(.370) 
-.334 
(.328) 
Outsider/insider ratio .031 
(.060) 
.036 
(.069) 
-.003 
(.075) 
.033 
(.066) 
Mills ratio .028 
(.467) 
-.287 
(.493) 
.239 
(.540) 
-.221 
(.477) 
Adjusted R² .145 .243 .456 .296 
F-statistic 2.845** 3.220** 7.672*** 3.633*** 
Significance levels:*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; N=70 
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